Philosophical Critiques of Effective Altruism

What is most striking in published commentaries on effective altruism written by philosophers is that they are often derisive and contemptuous in tone yet weak in argument. The objections they advance tend to be at least as much ad hominem as substantive in character. While I do not find this surprising, I do find it depressing. The primary goal of most of those who identify themselves as effective altruists is the prevention or alleviation of suffering and premature death resulting from poverty and disease in the areas of the world in which these problems are worst, or affect the greatest number of people. To the best of my knowledge, none of the philosophical critics of effective altruism rejects this goal. It is therefore dispiriting to read their criticisms, which often ridicule people who are devoting their lives, often at considerable personal sacrifice, to the achievement of this shared goal, and are often gleeful rather than constructive in their attempts to expose the effective altruists’ mistakes in their choices among means

In this brief article I will discuss some of the criticisms that philosophers have advanced against effective altruism. I will refrain from speculating about the psychology behind the critics’ antagonism. The explanations are no doubt complex and various. At the end I will comment briefly on criticisms of effective altruism by developmental economists. The best of these contrast with the philosophical commentaries in being expressed respectfully and in acknowledging that their disagreements are concerned with priorities and with the means of achieving shared ends.

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