A Mosquito Bite Against the Enactive Approach to Bodily Experiences
Author(s) -
Frédérique de Vignemont
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
the journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.927
H-Index - 50
eISSN - 1939-8549
pISSN - 0022-362X
DOI - 10.5840/jphil2011108411
Subject(s) - consciousness , perception , psychology , epistemology , cognitive science , face (sociological concept) , cognitive psychology , sociology , philosophy , social science
The enactive approach aims at providing a unified account of perceptual experiences in terms of bodily activities. Most enactive arguments come from the analysis of visual experiences (Noe, 2004), but there is one domain of consciousness where the enactive theses seem to be less controversial, namely, bodily experiences. After drawing the agenda for an enactive view of tactile experiences, I shall highlight the difficulties that it has to face, both conceptual and empirical.
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