z-logo
open-access-imgOpen Access
Schema Provoke False Knowing Even When Schema-Consistent Targets Had Not Been Presented
Author(s) -
Ryoma Yamada,
Yukio Itsukushima,
Tanjeem Azad,
D. Stephen Lindsay
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
international journal of psychological studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1918-722X
pISSN - 1918-7211
DOI - 10.5539/ijps.v6n3p62
Subject(s) - schema (genetic algorithms) , psychology , recall , cognitive psychology , perception , social psychology , computer science , information retrieval , neuroscience
Human memory is not always an accurate record of experienced events. Information that has never been experienced but is consistent with a relevant schema is sometimes mistaken as memory, giving rise to false memories. In this study, we focused on whether schema can provoke false memory for actions and for objects even when schema-consistent targets had not been presented. We presented schema-inconsistent actions and schema-inconsistent objects in a slide sequence depicting a kitchen. Later, we administered an old/new recognition test with remember/know judgments and Perception/Thought/Emotion/Context ratings for schema-inconsistent targets, schema-consistent distracters, and schema-inconsistent distracters. Both for the actions and the objects, participants more often falsely recognized schema-consistent distracters than schema-inconsistent distracters. That is, memory can be reconstructed along the scene schema, provoking false memory. However, these false memories were not typically accompanied by “remember” judgments but rather by “know” judgments. The similarity between schema-consistent targets and schema-consistent distracters is an essential factor for false recollection.

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.
Having issues? You can contact us here
Accelerating Research

Address

John Eccles House
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom