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Ownership-Control Discrepancy and Dividend Policy: Evidence from Tunisia
Author(s) -
Moncef Guizani,
Mondher Kouki
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
international business research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1913-9012
pISSN - 1913-9004
DOI - 10.5539/ibr.v5n1p127
Subject(s) - expropriation , dividend , dividend policy , shareholder , cash flow , control (management) , index (typography) , monetary economics , dividend payout ratio , control variable , empirical evidence , business , economics , econometrics , financial economics , corporate governance , accounting , finance , statistics , market economy , mathematics , philosophy , management , epistemology , world wide web , computer science

This paper examines the relation between the ownership-control discrepancy and dividend policy of Tunisian firms. Using data of 44 Tunisian firms, the current study provides evidence in support of the expropriation hypothesis. The empirical results show that the largest shareholder maintains a controlling power measured by Banzhaf index in excess of his cash flow rights which, leads to a low level of dividend payout ratios. In contrast, when the control power is shared between multiple large shareholders, Tunisian firms are likely to pay large dividends.

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