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espanolEste articulo reexamina la idea de Lijphart (1997) de que el voto obligatorio sea un instrumento efectivo para reducir la desigualdad del ingreso con un diseno de investigacion cuasi experimental basado en la tecnica de matching. Los resultados muestran que el voto obligatorio no tiene un impacto significativo sobre las politicas redistributivas. En base a la experiencia de America Latina, donde predomina el voto obligatorio junto a una alta desigualdad de ingresos, el articulo sostiene que el problema empirico del argumento lijphartiano se encuentra en el supuesto implicito de la existencia de un vinculo programatico entre politicos y electores. Se sugiere como hipotesis alternativa que la combinacion de alta participacion electoral y alta desigualdad puede deberse a la prevalencia de un vinculo clientelar, frecuente en democracias con instituciones debiles. EnglishThis article re-examines Lijphart’s (1997) idea that compulsory voting is an effective instrument to reduce income inequality. Using a quasiexperimental research design based on a matching technique, the results show that compulsory voting does not have a significant impact on redistributive policies. Examining the experience of Latin America, where mandatory voting prevails along with high income inequality, the article argues that the empirical problem with Lijphart’s argument lies in the implicit assumption that there is a programmatic linkage between politicians and voters. An alternative hypothesis is proposed, that the combination of high electoral participation and high inequality may be due to the prevalence of clientelistic linkage, frequent in democracies with weak institutions.

El voto obligatorio y la redistribución del ingreso reexaminando el argumento lijphartiano con "matching"