z-logo
open-access-imgOpen Access
Corporate Social Responsibility and Access to Finance
Author(s) -
Ioannis Ioannou,
George Serafeim,
Beiting Cheng
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
academy of management proceedings
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2376-7197
pISSN - 0065-0668
DOI - 10.5465/ambpp.2012.10912abstract
Subject(s) - corporate social responsibility , transparency (behavior) , stakeholder engagement , stakeholder , agency (philosophy) , business , information asymmetry , accounting , social capital , corporate finance , principal–agent problem , dimension (graph theory) , public economics , microeconomics , finance , public relations , economics , corporate governance , political science , philosophy , mathematics , epistemology , pure mathematics , law
In this paper, we investigate whether superior performance on corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies leads to better access to finance. We hypothesize that better access to finance can be attributed to a) reduced agency costs due to enhanced stakeholder engagement and b) reduced informational asymmetry due to increased transparency. Using a large cross-section of firms, we find that firms with better CSR performance face significantly lower capital constraints. Moreover, we provide evidence that both of the hypothesized mechanisms, better stakeholder engagement and transparency around CSR performance, are important in reducing capital constraints. The results are further confirmed using several alternative measures of capital constraints, a paired analysis based on a ratings shock to CSR performance, an instrumental variables and also a simultaneous equations approach. Finally, we show that the relation is driven by both the social and the environmental dimension of CSR.

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.
Having issues? You can contact us here
Accelerating Research

Address

John Eccles House
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom