Constructive Proof of the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in a Finite Strategic Game with Sequentially Locally Nonconstant Payoff Functions | Zendy

Yasuhito Tanaka | Zendy

Open Access

Constructive Proof of the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in a Finite Strategic Game with Sequentially Locally Nonconstant Payoff Functions

Author(s) -

Yasuhito Tanaka

Publication year - 2011

Publication title -

isrn computational mathematics

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

ISSN - 2090-7842

DOI - 10.5402/2012/459459

Subject(s) - constructive proof , constructive , nash equilibrium , lemma (botany) , mathematics , stochastic game , mathematical economics , best response , risk dominance , epsilon equilibrium , combinatorics , computer science , process (computing) , ecology , poaceae , biology , operating system

We will constructively prove the existence of a Nashequilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally nonconstantpayoff functions. The proof is based on the existence of approximate Nashequilibria which is proved by Sperner's lemma. We follow the Bishop-styleconstructive mathematics.

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