Fenomenologia de Edmund Husserl e Direito: caminhos e obstáculos

The objective of this paper is to assess what obstacles are to be faced by the law researcher when using Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological method. For such, three aspects related to these issues are exposed, namely: (i) the role phenomenology played in the decline of positivism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, showing the questions that remained unanswered by positivism and the answers presented, in contrast, by phenomenology; (ii) the contributions of phenomenology to the study of law, particularly regarding issues related to the concept of law and the rule interpretation; (iii) the obstacles arising from the influence of phenomenology and the questions then ensued, which need to be answered for the sake of development of legal science. As a conclusion, the main obstacles to be considered were the phenomenological method’s lack of transparency, the absence of verifiability regarding its results and the difficulty in adapting its premises to the mutability of the law as a social phenomenon.