As respostas de Berkeley ao ceticismo

O artigo compara alguns aspectos da refutacao do ceticismo nos Principios e nos Tres dialogos. Embora normalmente nao se veja nenhuma diferenca importante entre essas obras, duas hipoteses sao defendidas aqui: de um lado, Berkeley desloca o foco de sua critica das ideias abstratas para a nocao de materia e, de outro, muda sua estrategia de combate, da enunciacao imediata da verdade para a lenta elaboracao das consequencias ceticas da nocao de materia. Berkeley’s answers to skepticism Abstract The topic of this paper is a comparison between Berkeley´s refutation of skepticism in the Principles and in the Three Dialogues. It is usually held that there is no philosophical difference between these two works. However, I suggest that not only Berkeley´s diagnosis of the causes of skepticism changes from his criticism of abstract ideas to the notion of matter, but also that he changes his strategy of refutation: from a direct statement of the truth of immaterialism to an examination of the consequences of the notion of matter.