Linking Interpretative Theory To Practice: Examining An Underused Research Tool In Agricultural Education

Assumptions underlying two distinctly different paradigms – positivism and interpretivism — currently guide educational research. Although acceptance of interpretivism is increasing within education, positivism remains the dominant paradigm for both education and agricultural education. In an effort to increase the potential for naturalistic inquiry, this paper (1) provides an understanding of the philosophical foundation underlying interpretivism, (2) argues that a distinction exists between methodology (positivism, interpretivism) and method (quantitative, qualitative), with the former more critical than the latter, (3) proposes that agricultural education fits well with the interpretive paradigm and qualitative methods, and (4) outlines what this approach would look like in practice in terms of research design, data collection, data analysis, and rigor. The intent is to inform practice as well as to clarify criteria appropriate for assessing the merit of agricultural education research based upon the interpretive model. Mark Twain once said that if the only tool one has is a hammer, then one tends to treat everything as if it were a nail. While a hammer is the best choice for driving nails, it becomes less useful for a screw and basically useless for a twist tie or tape. Twain's logic especially applies to the research methods used in agricultural education. For years, agricultural education researchers have hammered away primarily with one research paradigm, positivism, as if all topics of inquiry were nails. Currently, the tools for realizing the full potential for agricultural education research remain locked in our toolbox. A Look at the Toolbox — Differing Perspectives For close to two decades leaders in agricultural education research have called for an examination of our beliefs, concepts, attitudes, and basic premises for research (McCracken, 1983; McCormick, 1984). More specifically Miller (1991) and Newcomb (1993) have called for recognition of creative efforts, theoretical writings and a greater connection between scholarship and teaching. To move toward the type of scholarship suggested by these seminal leaders, Wardlow (1989) argued that we should look beyond the dominant mode of inquiry that may inhibit our innovation and development of intellectual pursuits. We contend that this concern for the inclusion of alternative forms of scholarship is manifest in ongoing debates over the relative merits of what are generally referred to as positivist and interpretivist research paradigms. Thus, this concern is clouded by two problems: (1) a lack of coherent definitions, and (2) the focusing of most discussions on methods instead of on the basic assumptions of these two stances. We argue that the second problem is at the root of the confusion, and the first is a manifestation of it. A key issue in the paradigm debate centers on the “unity of the sciences” (Smith, 1983). In other words, the debate centers on the question “are the natural and social sciences basically the same or are the subject matters inherently different?” Interpretivist challenges to contemporary positivism can be compared with earlier efforts (marked by years of conflict and debate) to apply the model of the natural sciences to the study of people. The underlying assumptions and methods of the social sciences were, in many cases, Woods & Trexler Linking Interpretative Theory... Journal of Agricultural Education 69 Volume 42, Issue 2, 2001 transformed as social scientists—adhering to a positivist view of modern science— sought to emulate their colleagues in the natural sciences. Smith (1983) described how “this school of thought claimed that social investigation was a neutral activity in regard to values, and accordingly, social scientists conducting research should (1) eliminate all bias and preconceptions, (2) not be emotionally involved with or have a particular attitude toward the subject, and (3) move beyond common-sense belief” (p. 7). This last decree meant that social scientists should develop a neutral scientific language and be strictly confined to discussing the “what is” (that which is objective) of the social world and avoid the “what should be” (that which is subjective). Shortly after the idea of using the natural science’s approach to study the human world took root, a countermovement grew. The appearance of another school of thought — interpretivism — challenged the positivist paradigm and gave impetus to employing different methods within the social sciences. Dilthey (1988) contended that the complexity of the social world changes over time and cultural differences make it impossible to discover laws as in the natural sciences. Instead, he believed emphasis should be placed on understanding the individual or type. He suggested “the social sciences must be descriptive as opposed to explanatory or predictive and must concentrate on interpretive understanding” (Dilthey, 1988, p. 152). To shed further light on the differences between these approaches to understanding, Bernstein (1976) described the distinction between the positivist and interpretivist paradigms in terms of how theorists account for "manin-the-world," either through a "scientific image" or through a "manifest image." Bernstein stated: those who endorse the scientific image maintain that science will provide not a partial but a complete account, which can in principle, if not yet in fact, explain even the "indispensable core" of human concepts, by showing how they are based on more fundamental scientific principles. And those who endorse the manifest declare not just that a scientific account of man is incomplete, but that, if we "subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny," we will see in it a second-order discipline based on a more fundamental understanding of manin-the-world. (p. 120) The first view perceives human beings as complex physical systems differing from the rest of nature, not in kind, but perhaps in degree. Therefore, the products of science can provide explanations for how the system works. Inadequate explanations appear as temporary setbacks rather than failures. The alternative perspective counters that "scientific points of view are always both naive and at the same time dishonest and that failures in science indicate deep conceptual or categorical confusions" (Bernstein, 1976, p. 121). This contrasting epistemological base allows for a range of research perspectives or paradigms that include both positivism and interpretivism. Each differs in basic its underlying assumptions, which ultimately Table 1 Contrasting Views Underlying Alternative Research Paradigms Underlying assumptions and beliefs about: Positivism Interpretivism Purpose(s) of research Discover laws and generalizations that explain reality and allow for prediction and control Understand and interpret daily occurrences and social structures as well as the meanings that people give to the phenomena