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Does moral responsibility require mental time travel? Considerations about guidance control
Author(s) -
Beatriz Sorrentino Marques
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
filosofia unisinos
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.114
H-Index - 4
eISSN - 1984-8234
pISSN - 1519-5023
DOI - 10.4013/fsu.2018.191.10
Subject(s) - philosophy , humanities , psychology
The debate about moral responsibility for one’s actions often revolves around whether the agent had the ability to do otherwise. An alternative account of moral responsibility, however, focuses on the actual sequence that produces the agent’s action and which criteria it must fulfil for the agent to be considered morally responsible for her action. Mental Time Travel allows the agent to simulate a possible future scenario; therefore, it is relevant for the selection of a course of action. I will argue that implicit prospection is a rudimentary form of Mental Time Travel and that the role that implicit prospection, or non-rudimentary forms of Mental Time Travel, plays in the production of intentional actions helps explain guidance control and, hence, moral responsibility. Keywords: implicit prospection, guidance control, feeling the future, plan, intention.

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