Arguing about the world’s cardinality: Priority, existence, and metaphysical necessity

Metaphysicians still discuss about the number of things. According to monists, there is one thing, either fundamental (Priority Monism) or exclusionary (Existence Monism). According to pluralists, there are many things, either fundamental (Priority Pluralism) or exclusionary (Existence Pluralism). The claims of cardinality of these views are, presumably, metaphysical claims, which means, presumably, that they are necessarily true, if true at all. In this paper, I unravel a common pattern of some of the main arguments used by the parties involved and challenge their assumptions. By doing this, I intend to show that those arguments are all equally impotent to settle the question about the number of things because their conclusions are not necessary truths as they are meant to be. These views, at the very most, can be presented and defended as consistent ways of saying how many things, apparently, might be. Keywords: cardinality, fundamentality, existence, monism, pluralism, nihilism.