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On the intentionality-relative features of the world
Author(s) -
Rodrigo A. dos S. Gouvea
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
filosofia unisinos
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.114
H-Index - 4
eISSN - 1984-8234
pISSN - 1519-5023
DOI - 10.4013/fsu.2016.172.09
Subject(s) - intentionality , epistemology , philosophy , characterization (materials science) , materials science , nanotechnology
Many things we deal with in our daily lives seem to be products of our mental, intentional states. John Searle (1996, 2010) defended this thesis, and offered a characterization of the “intentionality-relative features of the world”. The present paper aims at contributing to our understanding of the nature of such entities. It presents and criticises Searle’s claims on the general properties of the intentionality-relative features of the world. An original characterization is offered in the paper, as a consequence of modifications I suggest making to Searle’s account, mainly in respect to the epistemological status of such entities. Keywords: intentionality, intentionality-relative features of the world, ontological subjectivity, epistemological objectivity.

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