A note on differential games with Pareto-optimal NASH equilibria: Deterministic and stochastic models<sup>†</sup>
Author(s) -
Alejandra Fonseca-Morales,
Onésimo Hernández–Lerma
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
journal of dynamics and games
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2164-6074
pISSN - 2164-6066
DOI - 10.3934/jdg.2017012
Subject(s) - nash equilibrium , mathematical economics , context (archaeology) , epsilon equilibrium , class (philosophy) , pareto principle , mathematics , risk dominance , mathematical optimization , best response , differential (mechanical device) , coordination game , computer science , physics , thermodynamics , paleontology , artificial intelligence , biology
Pareto optimality and Nash equilibrium are two standard solution concepts for cooperative and non-cooperative games, respectively. At the outset, these concepts are incompatible-see, for instance, [ 7 ] or [ 10 ]. But, on the other hand, there are particular games in which Nash equilibria turn out to be Pareto-optimal [ 1 ], [ 4 ], [ 6 ], [ 18 ], [ 20 ]. A class of these games has been identified in the context of discrete-time potential games [ 13 ]. In this paper we introduce several classes of deterministic and stochastic potential differential games [ 12 ] in which open-loop Nash equilibria are also Pareto optimal.
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