STRATEGIC SIGNALING AND NEW TECHNOLOGICALLY SUPERIOR PRODUCT INTRODUCTION: A GAME-THEORETIC MODEL WITH SIMULATION | Zendy

Madjid Tavana | Zendy; Debora Di Caprio | Zendy; Francisco J. SantosArteaga | Zendy

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STRATEGIC SIGNALING AND NEW TECHNOLOGICALLY SUPERIOR PRODUCT INTRODUCTION: A GAME-THEORETIC MODEL WITH SIMULATION

Author(s) -

Madjid Tavana,

Debora Di Caprio,

Francisco J. SantosArteaga

Publication year - 2018

Publication title -

technological and economic development of economy

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.634

H-Index - 47

eISSN - 2029-4921

pISSN - 2029-4913

DOI - 10.3846/tede.2018.4531

Subject(s) - computer science , product (mathematics) , process (computing) , industrial organization , supply and demand , process management , game theory , business , economics , microeconomics , mathematics , geometry , operating system

User acceptance of technology is essential to determine its success. The current paper incorporates the main properties of the technology acceptance models (TAMs) developed by management scholars into a pre-commitment signaling duopolistic framework, where two competing firms must decide the level of technological improvement of the products being introduced. As a result, the corresponding equilibria of the duopolistic technological games will be determined by demand-based factors, providing a novel approach and complementing the current supply-based economic and operational research models developed in the literature. The proposed model will be simulated numerically to illustrate the strategic optimality of the update process of smartphone and tablet characteristics defined by Apple and Samsung as the market developed.

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