El impacto de la persecución pública en los juicios de libre competencia en Chile
Author(s) -
Constanza Caicha,
Alejandro Micco,
Aldo González
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
estudios públicos
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 0718-3089
pISSN - 0716-1115
DOI - 10.38178/cep.vi132.266
Subject(s) - political science , humanities , art
The article seeks to measure the impact of the National Economic Prosecution Agency on antitrust trails in Chile. Using trial statistics, considering the timeline from the moment the tribunal was created, the involvement of the economic prosecutor shows an increase of 44 percent on the probability of conviction on an antitrust lawsuit. On the condition that the trial will end up with a ruling, statistics show an increase of 38 percent on the probability of conviction when the economic prosecutor gets involved. The results are robust in showing possible "selection-bias" on the part of the prosecution, something that is so when the Supreme Court gets involved and rules. The article also shows a tendency on the part of the prosecution to get involved in cases of sensitive markets and allegations of collusion. The fact that the indicted is a state institution or its size do not affect the probability of the Prosecution getting involved.
Accelerating Research
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom
Address
John Eccles HouseRobert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom