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<i>Muthos</i> as <i>Logos</i>: The Concept of Truth in the Poetry of Ted Hughes
Author(s) -
Janne Stigen Drangsholt
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
nordic journal of english studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.18
H-Index - 8
eISSN - 1654-6970
pISSN - 1502-7694
DOI - 10.35360/njes.142
Subject(s) - logos bible software , poetry , english language , political science , order (exchange) , humanities , media studies , philosophy , linguistics , sociology , theology , economics , finance
M y dissertation deals with the quest for truth in the poetry o f T e d Hughes , as m a d e manifest through tropes such as metaphor, paradox and anthropomorphism. For Hughes , poetry seems to represent a truth-revealing process with the potential o f enabling the h u m a n being to establish contact with the world-as-it-really-is. N o t as an empirically comprehensible entity, but as a presence that seems at once terrifyingly familiar and alien to h u m a n comprehension. In short, I will argue that the poetry represents an approach to truth governed by the mult i tude o f traditions and meanings incorporated in the concept o f logos. Interestingly, the poetry seems to acquire its driving force through the impenetrability o f metaphor and the non-reconciliatory force o f paradox. With Hughes , the paradox generally lies in the poetry's refusal to unite in singular, coherent meanings. It remains obscure to the extent that truth can only be found in the opposing, multifarious meanings o f the words and phrases. Similarly, the Hughes ian metaphor appears to be tautegorical in the sense that it is not constructed on the basis o f similarity. Thi s statement is inspired by Schelling's claim that myth refers only to itself as truth as well as H a n s Blumenberg's definition o f the 'absolute metaphor' as an expression that cannot be reversed into a logical sphere o f thought and reasoning. For Blumenberg, philosophical and scientific language is built upon a number o f absolute metaphors that express truth. These metaphors do not refer to some thing else and are consequently not transferable into any other type o f discourse. T h e indeterminacy and lack o f allegorical reference dominat ing this k ind o f metaphorical expression seem to result from it being an expression only o f itself as truth. Truth , in this context, has nothing to do with Platonic 'agreement', but has everything to do with letting something be seen, or, to quote Heidegger: ' T h e 'Being-true' o f logos as aletheia means that in legein as discourse the entities of which one is talking must be taken out o f their

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