Health Insurance Menu Design for Large Employers
Author(s) -
Kate Ho,
Robin Lee
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
psn: health care (topic)
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Reports
DOI - 10.3386/w27868
Subject(s) - business , health insurance , actuarial science , computer science , marketing , internet privacy , health care , economics , economic growth
We explore the challenges faced by a large employer designing a health insurance plan menu for its employees. Using detailed administrative data from Harvard University, we estimate a model of plan choice and utilization, and evaluate the benefits of cost sharing and plan variety. For a single plan with a generous out-of-pocket maximum, we find that a modest coinsurance rate of approximately 30% with a zero deductible maximizes average employee surplus. Gains from offering choice are limited if based solely on financial dimensions, but can be economically significant if paired with other features that appeal to sicker households.
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