Contract Enforcement and Productive Efficiency: Evidence from the Bidding and Renegotiation of Power Contracts in India | Zendy

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Contract Enforcement and Productive Efficiency: Evidence from the Bidding and Renegotiation of Power Contracts in India

Author(s) -

Nicholas P. Ryan

Publication year - 2019

Publication title -

repec: research papers in economics

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Reports

DOI - 10.3386/w25547

Subject(s) - bidding , enforcement , power (physics) , business , microeconomics , economics , industrial organization , law , political science , physics , quantum mechanics

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