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A Walrasian Theory of Sovereign Debt Auctions with Asymmetric Information
Author(s) -
Harold L. Cole,
Daniel Neuhann,
Guillermo Ordóñez
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
repec: research papers in economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Reports
DOI - 10.3386/w24890
Subject(s) - common value auction , sovereign debt , economics , information asymmetry , debt , sovereignty , microeconomics , mathematical economics , monetary economics , financial economics , finance , politics , political science , law

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