Is Your Lawyer a Lemon? Incentives and Selection in the Public Provision of Criminal Defense
Author(s) -
Amanda Agan,
Matthew Freedman,
Emily Owens
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
nber working paper series
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Reports
DOI - 10.3386/w24579
Subject(s) - incentive , selection (genetic algorithm) , criminology , political science , psychology , computer science , economics , artificial intelligence , microeconomics
Governments in the U.S. must offer free legal services to low-income people accused of crimes. These services are frequently provided by assigned counsel, who handle cases for indigent defendants on a contract basis. Court-assigned attorneys generally garner worse case outcomes than privately retained attorneys. Using detailed court records from one large jurisdiction in Texas, we find that the disparities in outcomes are primarily attributable to case characteristics and within-attorney differences across cases in which they are assigned versus retained. The selection of low-quality lawyers into assigned counsel and endogenous matching in the private market contribute less to the disparities.
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