Open AccessTowards an Efficient Mechanism for Prescription Drug Procurement
Author(s) -
Kyna Fong,
Michael Schwarz
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
nber working paper series
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Reports
DOI - 10.3386/w14718
Subject(s) - mechanism (biology) , drug , medical prescription , prescription drug , business , procurement , pharmacology , medicine , marketing , philosophy , epistemology
This paper applies ideas from mechanism design to model procurement of prescription drugs. We present a mechanism for government-funded market-driven drug procurement that achieves very close to full static efficiency -- all members have access to all but at most a single drug -- without distorting incentives for innovation.
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