The phenomenal brain : making room for a phenomenal-neural type identity theory of phenomenal consciousndes [sic]

Nonconceptual. According to Tye, the correctness conditions for phenomenal states are specified in terms of structured, existential states of affairs “involving properties and relations (and plausibly the subject of the experience).” (2005a) We can think of these simply as possible states of affairs (e.g. something’s being brown and round). These are purely semantic constructs akin to Russellian propositions in that they are, as Tye puts it, built out of “real world entities.” (2005a, p.223-225) 7 As such, I 6 The basic computational story is as follows: Poised states are representations that have the structural format of grouped, symbol-filled arrays that are mechanically built out of the inputs of sensory transducers (e.g. photoreceptors of the visual system, the chemoreceptors of gustatory and olfactory systems, the hair cells of the auditory system, as well as the nociceptors, the thermoreceptors, and the proprioceptors of the somatic sensory system). These arrays represent in a map-like manner in that cells within the array are dedicated to discrete spatial regions (e.g. in the body or in one’s visual field) to which descriptions are attached (e.g. “tissue damage” or “red, bright”). There are successive stages at which certain computations are performed on the cells in arrays that are initially constructed out of the inputs of sensory transducers. These routines yield further descriptive labels that are appended to the initial array over which further computations can be performed by the cognitive system. The functional / computational role of poised states consists in “offering up” information (i.e. information contained in the cells from each successive computational stage) about what is going on in one’s body (e.g. that one’s stomach walls are contracting in the case of hunger pangs) and immediate environment (i.e. that a certain object has a particular shape in the case of visual experiences) as they “wait around” for a time to be recruited for use by the cognitive system. Recruitment occurs when one’s attention is properly focused on the content of poised states, where to be “properly focused” amounts being aware that the state is being tokened by virtue of being aware of the content carried by the state. The basic idea is that in so far as these states / contents are poised, then they are available as inputs to cognitive processes whose function is to generate beliefs and/or desires using those states / contents. (2000, p. 62, 70-76; 1995, p.114, 121-123, 138, 140; 1996, p. 295-302) So pains, for example, are to be thought of in the following way: Initially, topographically structured, three-dimensional arrays are generated once nociceptors respond to certain changes in tissue (typically, when damaged). Each cell in the array is dedicated to a certain portion of the body. Adjacent cells correspond to adjacent bodily regions. Activity of a cell consists in its being “filled” with a descriptive label like “tissue damage”. Computations are performed over the filled cells of these initial arrays to generate more descriptive labels specifying more generally where the tissue damage is taking place (e.g. “left leg”, or “mid-torso”), as well as certain other bodily changes. 7 I’m presenting here Tye’s most recent account of nonconceptual content for perceptual experiences and bodily sensations. I take it that this account of nonconceptual content is an elaboration of Tye’s view as presented in Ten Problems and Consciousness, Color and Content. Most commentators initially took Tye’s nonconceptual contents to be propositions of some sort or other (e.g. Byrne, 2003; Dietrich and Adams,