Multi-party negotiation with preferences rather than utilities | Zendy

Fabien Delecroix | Zendy; Maxime Morge | Zendy; Thomas Nachtergaelle | Zendy; Jean-Christophe Routier | Zendy

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Multi-party negotiation with preferences rather than utilities

Author(s) -

Fabien Delecroix,

Maxime Morge,

Thomas Nachtergaelle,

Jean-Christophe Routier

Publication year - 2016

Publication title -

multiagent and grid systems

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.181

H-Index - 19

eISSN - 1875-9076

pISSN - 1574-1702

DOI - 10.3233/mgs-160248

Subject(s) - negotiation , rendezvous , computer science , order (exchange) , rationality , heuristic , resolution (logic) , process (computing) , operations research , artificial intelligence , business , political science , law , finance , aerospace engineering , spacecraft , engineering , operating system

International audienceWe propose here a multi-party negotiation game where agents exchange offers over a single issue. Contrary to most of existing works, we capture the agents' rationality with incomplete (weak and partial) preferences rather than with utility functions. We prove that our negotiation process is always successful and reach fair agreements when the agents are cooperative. In order to illustrate how our negotiation game can tackle distributed problem solving, we introduce a toy problem: two or more agents are paratroopers landed in an unknown maze. Since they aim to meet as soon as possible, they negotiate a rendezvous during their exploration. Our experimentations show that the added value of negotiation is a fast resolution since this adaptive heuristic shares the efforts performed by the agents

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