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Among the more significant problems of current moral philosophy is the distinction between Fact and Value, if value judgments can receive objective force. Some have proposed that there is no objectivity in value judgment. Others, the realist ones, claim that value judgments are as objective as the factual judgment. Hence, we will approach the realist standpoint, more strictly the MacIntyre's natural realism and how that standpoint deals with the fact/value distinction.

A Questão da distinção fato-valor e o Realismo Moral de Alasdair MacIntyre