‘A fair go’ in public policy
Author(s) -
David Bromell
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
policy quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2324-1101
pISSN - 2324-1098
DOI - 10.26686/pq.v10i2.4490
Subject(s) - distributive justice , conversation , sociology , law and economics , economic justice , ideal (ethics) , argument (complex analysis) , public policy , context (archaeology) , positive economics , politics , social justice , proxy (statistics) , social psychology , economics , political science , law , psychology , paleontology , biochemistry , chemistry , communication , machine learning , computer science , biology
In the context of the 2013 retirement income review (CFLRI, 2013), Kathryn Maloney and Malcolm Menzies from the Commission for Financial Literacy and Retirement Income put the question to me: what does ‘a fair go’ mean in public policy? I mentioned this in a chance conversation with Colin James, who suggested tackling the question in an active, verbal sense (‘a fair go’), rather than attempting to elaborate on ‘fairness’ as an abstract noun. Consequently, this paper does not propose ‘a theory of fairness’ as a proxy for, say, a theory of distributive justice, or a theory of social justice, even a non-ideal theory of justice (cf. Arvan, 2014; Simmons, 2010). My aim is more modest: to provide a framework for public reasoning in contexts where there is argument across the political spectrum about whether a public policy gives people who are affected by it ‘a fair go’. A fair go'in public policy
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