Investment Treaty Arbitration in Latin America
Author(s) -
Karen L. Remmer
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
latin american research review
Language(s) - Spanish
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.489
H-Index - 48
eISSN - 1542-4278
pISSN - 0023-8791
DOI - 10.25222/larr.154
Subject(s) - treaty , arbitration , compulsory arbitration , politics , investment protection , incentive , foreign direct investment , political science , latin americans , investment (military) , international trade , bilateral investment treaty , economics , law , international investment , market economy
This study analyzes variations in the incidence of state involvement in investment treaty arbitration in Latin America and the Caribbean over the 1987–2014 period. Its main contributions are fourfold. First, by focusing on the balance of incentives and opportunities facing political leaders and foreign investors, the study establishes a new basis for understanding the reasons actors opt for the risks and uncertainties of international arbitration instead of resolving international investment disputes via alternative means. Second, by restricting the focus of research to the Latin American region, the study is able to move beyond the analysis of relatively time-invariant structural and institutional conditions and crude indicators to address the role played by the preferences of political actors. Third, by disaggregating disputes by sector of investment, the analysis documents the variable role of ideology and electoral incentives in investment treaty arbitration. Finally, by underlining the distinctiveness of the Latin American experience with investment treaty arbitration, the study offers new insights into the global backlash against investment treaty arbitration, which has gone farther in the region than anywhere else. Overall, the results underline the potential payoffs of breaking down the international experience with investment treaty arbitration into regional patterns to obtain a deeper and more granular understanding of the political economy of investor-state dispute settlement. Resumen Este estudio analiza las variaciones en la incidencia de la participacion del Estado en el arbitraje de tratados de inversion en America Latina y el Caribe durante el periodo 1987–2014. Sus principales contribuciones son cuadruples. En primer lugar, al centrarse en el equilibrio de incentivos y oportunidades a los que se enfrentan los lideres politicos y los inversores extranjeros, el estudio establece una nueva base para entender las razones por las que los actores optan por los riesgos e incertidumbres del arbitraje internacional en lugar de resolver controversias internacionales en materia de inversiones por medios alternativos. En segundo lugar, al restringir el enfoque de la investigacion a la region latinoamericana, el estudio es capaz de ir mas alla del analisis de condiciones estructurales e institucionales relativamente invariables en el tiempo e indicadores burdos para abordar el papel desempenado por las preferencias de actores politicos. En tercer lugar, al desagregar las disputas por sector de inversion, el analisis documenta el papel variable de la ideologia y los incentivos electorales en el arbitraje de tratados de inversion. Por ultimo, al subrayar el caracter distintivo de la experiencia latinoamericana con el arbitraje de tratados de inversion, el estudio ofrece nuevas perspectivas sobre la reaccion global contra el arbitraje de tratados de inversion, que ha ido mas lejos en la region que en cualquier otro lugar. En general, los resultados subrayan los posibles beneficios de descomponerse la experiencia internacional con el arbitraje de tratados de inversion en patrones regionales para obtener una comprension mas profunda y mas granular de la economia politica de la resolucion de disputas entre inversionistas y estados.
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