Open AccessMorality,the Other and Third Persons
Author(s) -
Eva Buddeberg
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
european journal for philosophy of religion
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.25
H-Index - 9
ISSN - 1689-8311
DOI - 10.24204/ejpr.v5i4.208
Subject(s) - morality , argument (complex analysis) , perspective (graphical) , epistemology , third person , dimension (graph theory) , cognition , social psychology , sociology , psychology , cognitive dimensions of notations , philosophy , computer science , psychoanalysis , mathematics , artificial intelligence , chemistry , biochemistry , neuroscience , pure mathematics
This paper seeks to defend the thesis that a justification of morality has to underline the role of the second person in addition to a perpetual and on-going change of perspective that likewise includes the third and first person. To support this argument, the paper conceptualises responsibility as a moral relationship whose core constitutes the encounter with the other whom we recognise as a second-person authority. It then sketches how this pre-cognitive dimension must be supplemented by a cognitive insight which implies a dissociation from the second person and a consideration of third persons. on this basis, it finally provides an outline of how a possible tension between these different but all-together necessary perspectives could best be resolved.