CEO Compensation and Concurrent Executive Employment of Outside Directors | Zendy

YoungChul Kim | Zendy; SU JIN SONG | Zendy

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CEO Compensation and Concurrent Executive Employment of Outside Directors

Author(s) -

YoungChul Kim,

SU JIN SONG

Publication year - 2016

Publication title -

kdi journal of economic policy

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

eISSN - 1976-6904

pISSN - 1738-656X

DOI - 10.23895/kdijep.2016.38.3.17

Subject(s) - executive compensation , compensation (psychology) , business , accounting , labour economics , psychology , economics , corporate governance , finance , social psychology

In many advanced countries, most outside directors are executives, active or retired, at other firms; in other words, executives from other companies make executive compensation decisions. This situation may hinder the board of directors (BOD) in their efforts to optimize executive compensation levels objectively. Using a panel data analysis of the SP although a firm may establish board independence, the inherent concurrent employment of directors on a board continues to exist.

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