Open AccessTHE NYĀYA ARGUMENT FOR DISJUNCTIVISM
Author(s) -
Henry Ian Schiller
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
history of philosophy quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.175
H-Index - 7
eISSN - 2152-1026
pISSN - 0740-0675
DOI - 10.2307/48570928
Subject(s) - externalism , epistemology , philosophy , argument (complex analysis) , internalism and externalism , value (mathematics) , mathematics , statistics , chemistry , biochemistry
The Nyāya school of classical Indian epistemology defended (by today’s standards) a radical version of epistemic externalism. The school’s adherents also argued from their epistemological positions to an early version of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. In this paper, I assess the value of such an argument, concluding that a modified version of the Nyaya argument may be defensible.
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