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A MINIMALIST EXPLANATION OF TRUTH’S ASYMMETRY
Author(s) -
Julian Dodd
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
american philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.49
H-Index - 25
eISSN - 2152-1123
pISSN - 0003-0481
DOI - 10.2307/45128633
Subject(s) - asymmetry , philosophy , metaphysics , pessimism , skepticism , epistemology , physics , quantum mechanics
Suppose that Eleanor is drowsy. Truth’s asymmetry is illustrated by the following fact: while we accept that <Eleanor is drowsy> is true because Eleanor is drowsy, we do not accept that Eleanor is drowsy because <Eleanor is drowsy>is true. This asymmetry requires an explanation, but it has been alleged, notably by David Liggins, that the minimalist about truth cannot provide one. This paper counteracts this pessimism by arguing that the minimalist can successfully explain the asymmetry conceptually, rather than metaphysically. It then goes on to defend this account against objections, in the end concluding that explaining truth’s asymmetry is no problem for the minimalist.

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