PAINFULNESS, DESIRE, AND THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA | Zendy

Michael S. Brady | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

PAINFULNESS, DESIRE, AND THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA

Author(s) -

Michael S. Brady

Publication year - 2018

Publication title -

american philosophical quarterly

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.49

H-Index - 25

eISSN - 2152-1123

pISSN - 0003-0481

DOI - 10.2307/45128618

Subject(s) - dilemma , subject (documents) , criticism , psychology , aesthetics , sensation , state (computer science) , property (philosophy) , epistemology , philosophy , cognitive psychology , literature , art , computer science , algorithm , library science

The traditional desire view of painfulness maintains that pain sensations are painful because the subject desires that they not be occurring. A significant criticism of this view is that it apparently succumbs to a version of the Euthyphro Dilemma: the desire view, it is argued, is committed to an implausible answer to the question of why pain sensations are painful. In this paper, I explain and defend a new desire view, and one which can avoid the Euthyphro Dilemma. This new view maintains that painfulness is a property, not of pain sensations, but of a pain experience, understood as a relational state constituted by a pain sensation and a desire that the sensation not be occurring.

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research