In That Case, What Is the Question? Economics and the Demands of Contract Theory
Author(s) -
Richard Craswell
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
the yale law journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.84
H-Index - 76
eISSN - 1939-8611
pISSN - 0044-0094
DOI - 10.2307/3657493
Subject(s) - contract theory , economics , law and economics , incomplete contracts , positive economics , neoclassical economics , microeconomics , incentive
In his thoughtful essay, Eric Posner asks whether economic analysis has failed contract law and suggests that it has.' Not surprisingly, I hold a different opinion. That is, while I agree with much of what Posner says about particular economic findings, I disagree about what it would mean for economics to "fail" (or, for that matter, what it would mean to succeed). More specifically, Posner argues that economic analysis has failed in two respects, both as a descriptive theory and as a normative one. Descriptively, Posner says, economics fails to predict existing doctrine: Either existing doctrine differs from the rules that economics identifies as efficient, or economics is too indeterminate to identify the most efficient rules. And normatively, Posner says that this same indeterminacy also prevents economics from making any suggestions for the reform of contract law.
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