A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates | Zendy

Martin J. Osborne | Zendy; Alan Slivinski | Zendy

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A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates

Author(s) -

Martin J. Osborne,

Alan Slivinski

Publication year - 1996

Publication title -

the quarterly journal of economics

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 34.573

H-Index - 259

eISSN - 1531-4650

pISSN - 0033-5533

DOI - 10.2307/2946658

Subject(s) - competition (biology) , competition model , politics , mathematical economics , economics , microeconomics , computer science , political science , law , ecology , biology , profit (economics)

We develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choosewhether or not to run as candidates; a winner implements her favorite policy.The equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of runningand positively on the benefits of winning. For some parameter values allequilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates, whose positionsare distinct. Two-candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule thanunder a runoff system (cf. "Duverger's...

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