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Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments
Author(s) -
YeonKoo Che,
Tai-Yeong Chung
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
the rand journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1756-2171
pISSN - 0741-6261
DOI - 10.2307/2556047
Subject(s) - damages , outcome (game theory) , business , investment (military) , actuarial science , breach of contract , microeconomics , industrial organization , economics , law , political science , politics
We study alternative breach remedies in the presence of specific investments that generate a direct benefit to the investor's trading partner (referred to as "cooperative investments."). We find that (i) expectation damages perform very poorly, inducing no cooperative investment; (ii) privately stipulated liquidated damages can achieve a better, albeit inefficient, outcome; and (iii) the reliance damages perform the best, achieving the efficient outcome if ex post renegotiation is possible. These rankings stand in contrast to those found in the existing literature, but they explain many observed contracting practices.

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