Quality, Not Quantity: An Analysis of Confidential Settlements and Litigants' Economic Incentives | Zendy

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Quality, Not Quantity: An Analysis of Confidential Settlements and Litigants' Economic Incentives

Author(s) -

Alison Lothes

Publication year - 2005

Publication title -

university of pennsylvania law review

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.499

H-Index - 58

eISSN - 1942-8537

pISSN - 0041-9907

DOI - 10.2307/25047592

Subject(s) - incentive , human settlement , confidentiality , quality (philosophy) , business , economic analysis , economics , public economics , microeconomics , computer security , computer science , agricultural economics , geography , philosophy , archaeology , epistemology

The recent rise of “sunshine” legislation, which prohibits or reduces secret settlements of civil lawsuits, highlights public unease with confidential settlements. Recurring, highly publicized, dangerous events expose the costs of confidentiality: the Bridgestone/Firestone tire scandal and the Catholic Church sex abuse scandal are the most recent. Litigation regarding the Dalkon Shield, the Ford Pinto, and

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