On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action
Author(s) -
Cass R. Sunstein
Publication year - 1989
Publication title -
duke law journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.436
H-Index - 42
eISSN - 1939-9111
pISSN - 0012-7086
DOI - 10.2307/1372577
Subject(s) - agency (philosophy) , action (physics) , judicial review , law and economics , business , political science , public economics , economics , law , sociology , social science , physics , quantum mechanics
In this essay, I undertake three tasks. The first is to describe some of the difficulties of defining "benefits" in the setting of judicial review of administrative action. The second task is to offer reasons, though tentative and largely anecdotal ones, for an affirmative answer to the question whether aggressive judicial review has produced "net benefits." At the very least, I suggest, aggressive judicial review has had significant benefits in many settings. The third and final task is to outline some proposals by which to increase the benefits, and decrease the risks, of an aggressive judicial posture in administrative law.
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