Mental Disorder and Criminal Responsibility

The most widely accepted test of irresponsibility for a crime, on a plea of insanity, is whether the accused had "capacity and reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish right from wrong as to the particular act in question ..."1 Conviction on the charge results in a verdict of either "guilty," or "not guilty, by reason of insanity." The acceptance of this test makes the formula the measure of justice rather than an independent consideration of the accused's capacities for responsibility, which is the basis of selection for responsible tasks in our society. Capacity for responsibility is a qualitative faculty not equally bestowed by the Creator, and can be materially altered by life experiences. It is proposed to show that the present method of fixing criminal responsibility is not just, is not especially protective of society, and is not in consonance with present knowledge of human behavior. The aim of law is protection of society and justice for the person convicted of crime against the particular society or one of its members. A society which cannot afford justice for individuals is either so insecure or so depraved as to null the very purpose of its organization. A formula defining responsibility or irresponsibility in human behavior cannot do justice to individuals of unequal endowment in intellect, emotional stability, or probable intervention of various mental illnesses. These differences are often expressed in substantial disabilities which are not exposed by mere knowing right from wrong, and disregard of these must lead to legal perpetration of injustices. The present yardstick of criminal irresponsibility discloses nothing affirmative about possible mental handicaps at the time of the criminal act, unless it shows that the accused possessed the consciousness and physical force to wield the lethal weapon. Paradoxically, the required knowledge of right from wrong is generally held to be of a moral2 rather than of a legal nature; goodness from badness or evil in a social sense in interhuman relationships. The legal presumption that everyone has the requisite knowledge of criminal law precludes tests for determination of such knowledge.