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In the first part of this paper I will outline the debate in philosophy of  mind between those who, to borrow from Chalmers (Chalmers 1996) recognize the  existence of the hard problem of consciousness and between those who do not.  I will call the two groups non-reductivists and reductivists, respectively.  The second part will put forward a specific type of criticism against  reductivists - in short that its proponents incorrectly assume the resolution  of another dispute, the one between the so-called pessimistic and optimistic  inductivists. It will be claimed that such an assumption should not be made,  and that until the latter debate is settled, or at least until a specific  solution is offered within the context of the philosophy of mind, we have  every right to be skeptical towards reductivist attempts. In the third part  of the paper I will propose a possible solution which might offer some hope  of finding the middle ground between the two sides

The why of consciousness, theoretical gap and a double-aspect theory