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The implications of ownership concentration for shareholder protection and strategic decision-making
Author(s) -
Јеleikolić,
Verica Babić
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
economic annals
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.148
H-Index - 12
eISSN - 1820-7375
pISSN - 0013-3264
DOI - 10.2298/eka1611069n
Subject(s) - shareholder , corporate governance , business , accounting , order (exchange) , mechanism (biology) , industrial organization , finance , philosophy , epistemology
The purpose of corporate governance mechanisms is to prevent opportunistic behaviour by managers, in order to align the interests of owners and managers. Following from this, our research topic is the analysis of ownership concentration as an internal mechanism to protect the interests of shareholders. In the study of the interdependence between ownership concentration and shareholder protection, particular importance needs to be given to the relationship between ownership structure, the role of the board, and strategic decision-making. Starting from this interdependence, our research aim is to examine the impact of ownership concentration on the protection of shareholders’ interests and the board’s responsibility for firm strategy. This paper presents the results of an empirical, pilot study in the Republic of Serbia. The research confirms the interdependence of corporate governance mechanisms and strategic decision-making. Our findings indicate that ownership concentration protects majority shareholder interests and leads to lower board responsibility for strategic decision-making

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