Open AccessDos formas de escepticismo semántico
Author(s) -
Plínio Junqueira Smith
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
theoría
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1665-6415
DOI - 10.22201/ffyl.16656415p.2002.13.288
Subject(s) - skepticism , variety (cybernetics) , normative , criticism , epistemology , behaviorism , extensional definition , philosophy , psychology , quine , semantics (computer science) , linguistics , computer science , literature , artificial intelligence , art , paleontology , biology , tectonics , programming language
The author distinguishes and compares two varieties of semantic skepticism. The first one, called scientific, is found in W. O. Quine’s intention of accounting for language —conveniently organized in purely extensional terms— as a complex of dispositions in verbal behavior. The second variety is present, according to this paper, in the Wittgensteinian problematic of following a rule. The author sustains that the basic weakness of the latter variety lies in its being based on a problematic theory —such as behaviorism; additionally, scientific semantic skepticism is open to the criticism that it cannot account of the normative aspect of linguistic practices.