On the electoral punishment/rewarding of the incumbent Can voters do it?
Author(s) -
António Caleiro
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
perspectivas - journal of political science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2184-3902
DOI - 10.21814/perspectivas.335
Subject(s) - punishment (psychology) , rationality , government (linguistics) , positive economics , task (project management) , economics , obligation , political science , law and economics , microeconomics , welfare economics , social psychology , political economy , law , philosophy , psychology , management , linguistics
The article analyzes the possibility of voters penalizing or rewarding the incumbent (economic) performance at the polls. For this, it is considered that voters have limited rationality. This does not prevent them from performing this task without bias, which should serve as an obligation to use the elections to eectively penalize or reward the incumbent and/or not elect those who do not deserve it. Resumo O artigo analisa a possibilidade de os eleitores penalizarem, ou recompensarem, nas urnas, o desempenho (economico) do governo. Para tal, considera-se que os eleitores dispoem de racionalidade limitada. Tal nao os impede de desempenharem aquela tarefa sem enviesamento, o que deveria servir de obrigacao de utilizacao das eleicoes para, efectivamente, penalizar, ou recompensar, o governo e/ou nao elegerem quem nao o merece.
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