Mixing Goods with Two-Part Tariffs
Author(s) -
Steffen Hoernig,
Tommaso Valletti
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
ssrn electronic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1556-5068
DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.934533
Subject(s) - mixing (physics) , tariff , pareto principle , business , price discrimination , economics , microeconomics , commerce , international economics , operations management , physics , quantum mechanics
We consider a market where consumers mix content offered by different firms. We show how tariff structures have an impact on firms' profits and efficiency. As compared to pure linear pricing, when firms charge two-part tariffs they make higher profits, while consumers are worse off and the allocation is not first-best since too little mixing occurs. Flat subscription fees make mixing unattractive and are Pareto-dominated by all the other types of tariffs.
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