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When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games
Author(s) -
George J. Mailath,
Volker Nocke,
Lucy White
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
ssrn electronic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1556-5068
DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.605606
Subject(s) - simple (philosophy) , punishment (psychology) , criminology , law , political science , actuarial science , law and economics , economics , psychology , social psychology , philosophy , epistemology
In repeated normal-form games, simple penal codes (Abreu 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. We provide two examples illustrating that a subgame-perfect outcome may be supported only by a profile with the property that the continuation play after a deviation is tailored not only to the identity of the deviator, but also to the nature of the deviation.

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