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Estate and Capital Gains Taxation: Efficiency and Political Economy Considerations
Author(s) -
Saku Aura
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
ssrn electronic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1556-5068
DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.536502
Subject(s) - politics , estate , capital (architecture) , economics , market economy , real estate , monetary economics , business , economic system , finance , political science , law , archaeology , history
In this paper a simple dynastic overlapping-generations model with homogeneous agents is used to analy ze the optimal use of capital in- come tax, labor income tax and estate tax. The results of this analysis add to the conventional wisdom about capital income taxation: while it is true that in the long run the estate tax rate should be set to zero, it is also true that other capital income taxation is a usable policy tool even in the steady state. The other contribution of the paper is the building of a simple dynamic political economy model where the structure of capital taxes is determined. In a median-voter framework with no policy commitment, estate taxation is used too heavily as a capital-tax-revenue-collecting tool relative to the second-best optimum for the social planner.

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