The Value of Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment
Author(s) -
Paul Resnick,
Richard Zeckhauser,
John Swanson,
Kate Lockwood
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
ssrn electronic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1556-5068
DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.385206
Subject(s) - reputation , guitar , observational study , value (mathematics) , outcome (game theory) , population , empirical research , business , advertising , economics , internet privacy , marketing , actuarial science , microeconomics , computer science , statistics , mathematics , demography , political science , law , management , sociology
We conducted the first randomized controlled study of an Internet reputation mechanism. A high-reputation, established eBay dealer sold matched pairs of items -- batches of vintage postcards -- under his regular identity and new seller identities (also operated by him). As predicted, the established identity fared better. The difference in buyers' willingness-to-pay was 8.1% of the selling price. A subsidiary experiment followed the same format, but compared sales by relatively new sellers with and without negative feedback. Surprisingly, one or two negative feedbacks for our new sellers did not affect buyers' willingness-to-pay.
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