Open AccessIntensity of Effort in Contests with Few or Many Winners
Author(s) -
Dimitry Rtischev
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
ssrn electronic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1556-5068
DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.3679105
Subject(s) - intensity (physics) , r&d intensity , economics , business , advertising , management , physics , optics
The paper applies multi-prize contest theory to explore the connection between scarcity of prizes and intensity of competition. Equilibrium levels of effort are compared across contests that differ in the number of prizes and in which the utility of winning or losing is influenced by the relative numbers of winners and losers. Application to the study of socioeconomic competition is discussed.
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