Open AccessA Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons
Author(s) -
László Á. Kóczy
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
ssrn electronic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1556-5068
DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.304452
Subject(s) - tragedy of the commons , tragedy (event) , commons , political science , law and economics , environmental ethics , law , philosophy , sociology , social science
In the model of Funaki and Yamato (1999) the tragedy of the commons can be avoided with pessimistic players, while this does not hold for optimistic players. We propose a new core concept to overcome this puzzle and provide numerical simulations of simple games where the conclusions coincide or are less sensitive to behavioural assumptions.
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