Moral Hazard And The U.S. Stock Market: Analyzing The 'Greenspan Put'?
Author(s) -
Marcus Miller,
Paul A. Weller,
Lei Zhang
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
ssrn electronic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1556-5068
DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.300896
Subject(s) - economics , stock market , downside risk , moral hazard , financial economics , credibility , monetary policy , monetary economics , keynesian economics , philosophy , microeconomics , incentive , portfolio , paleontology , epistemology , horse , biology
When the risk premium in the US stock market fell far below its historic level, Shiller (2000) attributed this to a bubble driven by psychological factors. As an alternative explanation, we point out that the observed risk premium may be reduced by one-sided intervention policy on the part of the Federal Reserve, which leads investors into the erroneous belief that they are insured against downside risk. By allowing for partial credibility and state dependent risk aversion, we show that this "insurance" - referred to as the Greenspan put - is consistent with the observation that implied volatility rises as the market falls. Our bubble, like Shiller's, involves market psychology, but what we describe is not so much "irrational exuberance" as exaggerated faith in the stabilizing power of Mr. Greenspan.
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