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Sequential Screening and the Relationship between Principal's Preferences and Agent's Incentives
Author(s) -
Daniel Danau,
Annalisa Vinella
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
ssrn electronic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 1556-5068
DOI - 10.2139/ssrn.2748477
Subject(s) - incentive , principal (computer security) , principal–agent problem , business , psychology , social psychology , microeconomics , economics , computer science , computer security , finance , corporate governance

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